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Dependency, Taxes, and Alternative Families
PatriciaA. Cain

I.

INTRODUCTION

In her book, The Neutered Mother,1 Professor Martha Fineman makes a
plea that we stop viewing the family as consisting primarily of a husband
and wife, living together with their biological children. 2 Not only does this
archetypal family not exist in the majority of households any longer, but also
focusing on the marriage bond obscures the more important relationships of
dependency within both traditional and non-traditional households.3 Her
overarching theme is that governmental support for the family ought to
support relationships of dependency
rather than the adult sexual bond
4
between husband and wife.

Professor Edward McCaffery has criticized the current income tax
system because it is built around the concept of the traditional family-the
Ozzie and Harriet family of 1950's television where the husband works
5
outside the home and the wife stays home and cares for the children.
Professor Nancy Staudt has critiqued the social security system because it,
too, is based on the concept of the traditional gendered family, with the
husband working outside the home and the wife staying home to raise the
children. 6 Most of these critiques, however, focus primarily on the harm
done to the adult female in the family, whether she is a dependent or
working wife. My focus is on non-traditional families with children.

1. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
2.

Id. at 1.

3.

Id. at 1-2, passim.

4.

Id. at 230.

5. Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Toward Equality: Gender Discrimination, Market
Efficiency, andSocial Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595 (1993); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the
Family:A FreshLook at BehavioralGender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983 (1993); see
also Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code, 21 BuFF. L. REv 49 (1972).
6. Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996); see also Edward J.
McCafferty, The Burdens OfBenefits, 44 VILL. L. REv. 445 (1999); Mary E. Becker, ObscuringThe
Struggle, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 264 (1989).
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Non-traditional families include unmarried heterosexual parents,
sometimes living together, as well as same sex partners who co-parent
children that are sometimes legally recognized as the children of both
parents. In all of these non-traditional families, the children are classified as
nonmarital-historically known as illegitimate or bastard.7 Such children
clearly fall within a category that can be described as "other." Marriage,
however, can improve the status of the child. If the biological Parents marry,
the child's status can move from illegitimate to legitimate. If either the
mother or father has custody of the nonmarital child and marries someone
who is clearly not the biological parent, at least the child obtains
the status of
9
stepchild. Stepchild is a legal category and can carry benefits.
As Professor Dorothy Roberts has taught us, many of these alternative
families are black families.1i Over half the children in foster care are
black."l The genetic tie that is normally recognized as the most important
12
link between parent and child is more malleable in black families.
Furthermore, the law has historically interpreted the genetic tie's
significance to parenthood in a way that preserves the patriarchal nuclear
family. Cases concerning the parental rights of unwed fathers and sperm
donors reveal that the law's central objective is to protect the integrity of
families founded on heterosexual marriage, 13while leaving women's
autonomous bonds with their children vulnerable.
Presently, state laws generally allow a mother to marry a man who is
not the father and have the child legitimated so long as the man is willing to
recognize the child as his own. 14 As a result of these state laws marriage not
only helps the children born within it, but marriage can also help children

7.

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993).

8.

See H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 5.3 (2nd ed. 1987).

9. E.g., a stepparent can claim head of household reporting status, after divorce or death, so
long as he or she retains the role of primary supporter of the stepchild. See I.R.C. § 2(b) (2001).
10.

See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 269-70 (1995).

11.

Id. at 257.

12.

Id. at 269-70.

13.

Id. at 252.

14. See generally CLARK, supra note 8, § 5.3. For an example of a state statute that presumes
a husband to be the father of the mother's child, see CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 6.11 (West 2001);
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 2001); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129-30 (1989)

(holding the forerunner to this statute constitutional even though it deprives a biological father of his
right to a parent-child relationship); Dye v. Geiger, 554 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Iowa 1996) (holding that
presumption of legitimacy cannot be rebutted at time of divorce in order to avoid obligation of child
support).
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born outside of it. 15 There are two instances in which marriage is simply not
a possibility for improving the status of a child. The man who is the father or
who might be willing to claim paternity is dead, and thus marriage is
impossible. The mother or father is in a lesbian or gay same sex relationship,
in which case marriage is similarly impossible.
This article focuses on both sorts of nontraditional families: those in
which the marital bond is not only missing, but also is impossible. I am
particularly concerned about the children in these families because children
are inevitably dependent. Good social policy recognizes this dependency and
provides a means for government to step in and fill the void when children
do not have sufficient parental support. Good social policy also supports
parents who do the "right thing" in supporting their own children. 17 In other
words, support of children is a good thing and thus the government does the
right thing when it supports children directly or indirectly by supporting
their parents. 18
As it turns out, however, the government only supports some children.
The children it supports most-either directly or indirectly-are children in
family settings that include marriage. 19 And however strongly the
government may want to defend marriage, it seems unfair to place the
burden of this pro-marriage policy on nonmarital children. It seems equally
unfair to punish a child of a married couple, when after the divorce or death

15. Even if the marriage fails to legitimate the child, the marriage creates a stepparent
relationship, which is often recognized by the law. For example, some states are willing to impose
child support obligations on a stepparent under an equitable estoppel theory. See, e.g., W. v. W., No.
16429, 2001 WL752703, at *4 (Conn. July 17, 2001); Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351, 359 (N.J.
1984).
16. Jane C. Murphy & Margaret 3. Potthast, Domestic Violence, SubstanceAbuse, and Child
Welfare: The Legal System's Response, 3 . HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 88 (1999).
17. Tax law provides several examples. Support of children entitles the parent(s) to a
dependency exemption. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152 (2001). Support of a child by a single parent
entitles that parent to a reduced rate schedule by classifying the parent as a "head of household." See
26 U.S.C. § 1(b); 26 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2001). The costs of childcare for a dependent child can reduce
taxable income. See 26 U.S.C. § 21 (2001). A refundable earned income credit is given to certain
low-income individuals but more credit is given to individuals with children. See 26 U.S.C. § 32
(2001). Certain taxpayers with children get a $600 per child credit per year subject to certain
limitations. See 26 U.S.C. § 24 (2001).
18. See John F. Coverdale, MissingPersons: Childrenin the Tax Treatment of Marriage,48
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 475 (1998) (arguing that tax law can support children better by providing
greater incentives for parents of children to be married). While one may or may not agree with
Professor Coverdale's thesis that the tax code ought to provide greater support for married couples,
the focus on marriage ignores those children in households where it is impossible for the parents to
marry.
19. E.g., stepchildren are often equated with children in federal statutes, such as the head of
household provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. § 2(b). But one cannot even
establish a stepparent relationship in the absence of marriage.
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that ends the marital relationship, that child winds up being supported by the
life partner of the surviving tarent. Such "second parents," often referred to
as "psychological parents," are generally not recognized as parents under
the law, unless they have gone through the formal steps to adopt the child.2 1
The law's failure to recognize such parent-child relationships is often
detrimental to the child.
Consider, for example, the case of Sandra Rovira and her two sons,
Frank and Alfred Morales. 22 Marjorie Forlini and Sandra Rovira were in a
committed same sex relationship for twelve years until Forlini died of
cancer. 2 3 Two years into the relationship, Rovira's two minor children came
to live with them. 24 Forlini supported them for ten years, claiming them as
dependents on her tax return under the provision that applies to unrelated
members of the household. 25 At Forlini's death, Rovira and her sons
submitted a claim to Forlini's employer, AT&T, for a death benefit payment
from her pension plan. 26 The pension plan provided for benefits only to
spouses, dependent children under age twenty-three, or other dependent
relatives. 27 Neither the partner, Rovira, nor the two sons that Forlini had
28
supported for ten years as her own, qualified under the plan.
Forlini worked in New York. Under New York law, same sex partners
had been recognized as family for housing purposes 29 and anti-

20. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 19 (1973);
see also Symposium, The Impact of PsychologicalParentingon Child Welfare Decision-Making, 12
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 485 (1984).
21. Some states recognize the right of the second parent to adopt the child even though the
state adoption statutes appear to contemplate such adoptions only when the second parent is married
to the biological parent. Since marriage is impossible for same sex couples, some courts have been
willing to construe adoption statutes liberally in the "best interest of the child" so as to provide the
child with two legally recognized parents. See, e.g., In Re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315
(Mass. 1993); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995).
22.

Rovira v. AT&T, 817 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).

23.

Id. at 1064.

24.

Id.

25. Under I.R.C. § 152(a)(9) (2001), a taxpayer may claim an exemption for an unrelated
dependent provided the taxpayer provides over half the support for the dependent and the dependent
is a member of the taxpayer's household. A person unrelated to the taxpayer satisfies this provision
if the person lives with the taxpayer for the entire year as a member of the taxpayer's household and
their relationship does not violate local laws. Certain temporary absences from the taxpayer's home
are not taken into account. See Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(b) (1971).
26.

Rovira, 817 F. Supp. at 1067.

27.

Id. at 1065.

28.

Id. at 1067.

29.

Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 211 (1989).

HeinOnline -- 5 J. Gender Race & Just. 270 2001-2002

Dependency, Taxes, andAlternativeFamilies

discrimination laws had been used successfully to gain extension of
employee benefits to domestic partners. 30 But those state law rulings were of
no help to this family because Forlini was covered by a retirement plan.
Almost all retirement plans are subject to the Employment Retirement
Insurance and Security Act (ERISA), 3 1 which pre-empts state law.32

Because ERISA governed the AT&T plan, New York laws and rulings that
recognized alternative families could not be applied to recognize this
alternative family and benefit the dependent children. 33 In the absence of
any applicable federal law to define family for purposes of retirement plans,
the court relied upon Webster's Dictionary. 4 According to Webster's,
which is nothing more than a reflection of common word usage and does not
include policy considerations, "spouse" means only those persons "married"
to each other and "child" means "biological child, adopted child, or stepchild." If there is no marriage and no biological tie, then there is no parentchild relationship. Dependency is irrelevant.
This article will explore three additional examples of how current law is
biased against dependent children in non-traditional families. First, it will
consider the rules that govern filing status under federal income tax law.
Then it will discuss the rules governing two federal income tax credit
provisions, the earned income tax credit (EITC)35 and the more recently
enacted "child tax credit."3 6 The third example comes from state inheritance
tax laws that either exempt transfers to children from the tax, or tax such
transfers more lightly than other transfers. 3 7 The purpose of this article is
fairly narrow: to uncover these biases so that policy makers can see how

30.

Gay Teachers Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 585 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).

31.

29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2001).

32. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); see also Catherine L. Fisk, ERISA Preemption of State and Local
Laws on Domestic Partnershipand Sexual Orientation Discriminationin Employment, 8 UCLA
WoMEN's L.J. 267 (1998); Kathleen M. Meagher, San Francisco'sEqual Benefits Ordinance
Litigation:FederalPreemption and Market Participation,188 PLI/CRIM 169, 181 (2001).
33.

Meagher, supranote 32, at 18.

34.

Rovira, 817 F. Supp. at 1072 n.25.

35.

I.R.C. § 32 (2001).

36.

.LR.C. § 24 (2001).

37.

Seegenerally IOWACODE § 450.9 (2001).

In computing the tax on the net estate, the entire amount of property, interest in
property, and income passing to the surviving spouse, and parents, grandparents, greatgrandparents, and other lineal ascendants, children including legally adopted children
and biological children entitled to inherit under the laws of this state, stepchildren, and
grandchildren, great- grandchildren, and other lineal descendants are exempt from tax.
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they operate. In every case, the bias can be easily corrected by extending the
benefit of the tax rule more broadly. Whether this extension also has costs
that might outweigh the benefits is beyond the scope of this article.
II.

FILING STATUS UNDER THE FEDERAL INCOME

A.

TAx

Children in TraditionalFamilies

The joint return benefits the wage-earning spouse who supports his or
her stay-at-home spouse. 3 8 The benefit is provided in the form of a lower tax
rate on the individual wage-earner's income. 39 As an additional benefit to

this traditional family, the value of the caretaking and domestic services
provided by the stay-at-home spouse goes untaxed.4 ° She (and it usually is a
she) is rewarded for her labors by the government, who has given her
husband a break on his taxes under the joint return rates, and has vested her
in the social security system to which her husband contributes. 4 1 When
children arrive in the traditional family, the parents 4et an additional tax
deduction in the form of a dependency exemption and the child also
becomes vested in the social security
system in the event Dad dies before the
43
child ceases to be dependent.

Once Dad dies, Mom, so long as she has a dependent child, can
continue to file a joint return for two years, 44 thereby reaping the benefits of

38. This benefit occurs because the joint return rates effectively split income between the
spouses. See generally Michael J. McIntyre & Olvier Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a
Comprehensiveand Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573, at Appendix 1 (1977).
39.

See I.R.C. § 1(2001).

40. Imputed income from services within the home is excluded from the tax base. For a more
detailed explanation, see Ann F. Thomas, Marriage and the Income Tax Yesterday, Today, and
Tomorrow: A Primerand Legislative Scorecard, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 1, 50-51 (1999); see
also Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint Return,
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1469, 1481-82 (1997).
41. The current social security system is based on the concept that wives are dependent. See
Jonathan Barry Forman, Making Social Security Workfor Women and Men, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM.
RTS. 359, 362-65 (1999). Thus, widows tend to benefit from social security. The system, however,
does not adequately distinguish between those who are the neediest and those who are not. Id. at
361; see also Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, The Impact ofSocial Security Reform on
Women's Economic Security, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 375 (1999). Nancy Staudt has criticized
the social security system, which appears to give the wife the benefit of her husband's work while at
the same time devaluing her own work. See Staudt, supra note 6.
42.

See I.R.C. § 151 (2001).

43.

See42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2001).

44.

See I.R.C. § 2(a) (2001); I.R.C. § l(a)(2).
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the lower tax rates available in the joint return. After that, so long as Mom
and the child remain together and the child is a dependent, Mom can file
under the second best rate schedule, head of household, 45 which4 provides
rates slightly higher than the joint rates, but lower than single rates.J
If Dad and Mom divorce, Mom will no longer be entitled to use the
joint return rates-not for the two years given a surviving spouse, not for any
length of time. But she may qualify for the head of household rates if she
maintains a household for one or more of the children. And of course, if
Mom leaves Dad and Dad ends up with the kids, Dad will get the same head
of household benefits that are available to Mom. The provisions are gender
neutral. A "parent" who maintains a household for a child is entitled to claim
the benefit of the head of household rates.47 And, if there are at least two
that
children in the family, the divorced couple can arrange their affairs so
48
both Mom and Dad can take advantage of the head of household rates.
The tax savings produced by the lower head of household rates are
presumably justified because they inhere to the benefit of the dependent
child through the person who is supporting that child.49 When the provision
was first enacted in 1951, it was explained as follows:
It is believed that taxpayers, not having spouses but nevertheless
required to maintain a household for the benefit of other

45. A person can file as "head of household" if she either maintains a household for her child
(whether or not she claims the child as her dependent) or for dependents who are related to her,
provided she lives in the household with the child or dependent. Alternatively, she can file as head of
household if she maintains a household for a parent, whether or not she lives with the parent. I.R.C.
§ 2(b) (2001).
46. See I.R.C. § 1(b) (2001) (detailing head of household rates); I.R.C. § 2(b) (defining head
of household).
47. I.R.C. § 2(b) defines head of household as someone who maintains a household (i.e.,
provides over fifty percent of the costs) for a child or other qualified relative.
48. For example, Dad could maintain his household (i.e., provide more than half the support)
for one child and Mom could maintain her household for the other child. They can also agree
between them as to who will be entitled to the dependency exemption for each child. See I.R.C. §
152(e).
In fact, it is theoretically possible for a divorced couple to continue to live together and both
claim head of household status for tax purposes, provided their home is structured so as to constitute
two households. For example, separate living spaces and kitchens might constitute two households
even if they are contained in the same building. See Fleming v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (CCII) 1974-137
(1974).
49. One need not have a child to qualify as head of household for income tax purposes. It is
sufficient for the taxpayer to maintain a common household in which a dependent resides, so long as
the dependent is either a child of the taxpayer or related to the taxpayer through blood or marriage as
provided in I.R.C. §§ 152(a)(l)-(8). If the dependent is the taxpayer's father or mother, head of
household status may be claimed even if the taxpayer maintains a separate household for the parent.
Id.
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individuals, are in a somewhat similar position to married couples
who, because they may share their income, are treated under
present law substantially as if they were two single individuals
each with half of the total income of the couple. The income of a
head of household who must maintain a home for a child, for
example, is likely to be shared with the child to the extent
necessary to maintain the home, and raise and educate the child.
This, it is believed, 50justifies the extension of some of the benefits

of income splitting.
Thus, for traditional families with one worker and children, the federal
tax law provides the benefit of joint return rates for married parents. For
divorced parents, the income splitting benefit can be retained if the parties
take advantage of Sections 71 and 215 of the Internal Revenue Code. 5 1 In
addition, at least one of the divorced parents ought to be able to claim head
of household filing status. 52 And, if the couple have two children, with
appropriate planning, they can both claim head of household status.
B.

Children in NontraditionalFamilies

1. The Heterosexual Unmarried Couple
When a man and woman live together without the tie of marriage, they
cannot take advantage of the lower joint return rates. Instead, they file as
single persons, 53 the highest of the three rate schedules available for
individual taxpayers. 54 Some men and women are better off filing as single

50. H.R. REP. No. 82-586, at 11 (1951), reprinted in 1951-2 C.B. 357, 364. For a thorough
discussion of the legislative provision, as originally enacted and as amended in 1954, see Grace v.
Comm'r, 51 T.C. 685 (1969).
51. Section 71 taxes the wife on alimony she receives from the husband and Section 215
gives the husband an above-the-line tax deduction. I.R.C. § 215 (2001). The effect is to split the
husband's income. See also Mary Moers Wenig, MaritalStatus and Taxes, in UNMARRIED COUPLES
AND THE LAw 257-58 (G. Douthwaite ed., 1979) (explaining the income splitting benefits of
sections 71 and 215 for two-eamer married couples who might consider divorce solely for the tax
benefits); Daniel Lathrope, State DefinedMaritalStatus, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 257 (1983).
52. Note that the divorced couple might have to plan carefully to be sure that head of
household filing status benefits the right person. The father who supports his ex-wife and child in the
wife's residence cannot claim head of household status because the taxpayer must occupy the same
house as the child. However, the father need not have legal custody of the child to qualify. He
would, however, have to maintain physical custody of the child for more than half the year. See, e.g.,
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-25-092 (Mar. 22, 1983); see also Grace, 51 T.C. at 685.
53.

I.R.C. § I(c) (2001).

54.

The highest rates in section one apply to taxpayers that are entities such as estates and
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taxpayers, but they are not the men and women who constitute the traditional
family. Filing as a single taxpayer is beneficial only if both partners are
working or otherwise earning income. 55 Wives who enter the marketplace
face the highest marginal bracket of all because their incomes will be added
to that of their husbands, and thus be taxed at the highest marginal rates. If
the husband has used up the lower brackets with his income, e.g., the fifteen
percent and twenty eight percent brackets, then the wife's income is taxed at
the next bracket, thirty one percent.5 6 This bunching of income in the joint
return causes a married couple with two earners to pay a higher tax than if
they each filed a single return for his or her own income. 5 7 Professor Ed
McCaffery, building on the earlier work of Professor Grace Blumberg,58 has
written extensively about this phenomenon. 59 McCaffery, Blumberg, and
many others have shown that the tax system is structured in such a way as to
discourage wives from working. 60 While this aspect of the tax law is beyond
the scope of this article, it is certainly consistent with my broader point that
the tax system is designed to benefit traditional families over nontraditional
ones. Families with working wives are one additional type of non-traditional
family.
a.

Single-EarnerFamily

Non-traditional, unmarried, heterosexual couples with children face
different sorts of tax problems, depending on whether or not both parents
work. Imagine a family consisting of a father, who is the primary wageearner, and a mother and child who rely on him for support. This family
cannot claim the lower joint return rates, which means that the family as a
household will pay higher taxes, leaving fewer dollars behind to support the
child in the home. Indeed, this family would be encouraged to enter the
world of marriage and traditional families in order to minimize their tax

trusts. See I.R.C. § 1(e).
55.

See McIntyre & Oldman, supranote 38, at App. 1

56.

See I.R.C. § 1(a).

57.

Compare rates in § 1(a) and § l(c).

58.

See Blumberg, supra note 5.

59.

EDWARD J. McCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN (1997).

60. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional
Choices, 96 COLuM. L. REV. 2001 (1996); Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure:
Identifying and Addressing the Gendered Nature of the Tax Lmv, 13 J.L. & POL. 241 (1997);
Symposium, Women, Equity, andFederal Tax Policy: Open Questions, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 1 (1999); Amy L. Wax, Caring Enough: Sex Roles, Work, and Taxing Women, 44 ViLE. L.
REv. 495 (1999).
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61

burden.
However, if they resist the urge to marry for tax savings, then their next
best option for reducing taxes is for the father to file as head of household.62
To claim head of household, he must:
(1) Be single, and
(2) Maintain and live in a home, and
(3) The home must be the principal abode of the child.6 3
In the view of the IRS, this father ought to be able to claim head of
household filing status so long as the child is his child.64 If the father is not
the biological father, he may become the adoptive father in order to
qualify. 65 However, boyfriends who move in with mothers and support them
and their children, no matter for how6 6long, are not entitled to claim head of
household status on their tax returns.
Thus, if the father is the biological father of this child, he may claim
head of household filing status. 67 However, he must also prove that he
provided more than half the cost of maintaining the home. 6 8 The fact that we
have never treated the "stay-at-home wife" as though she provided economic
support for the family will inure to the benefit of this father. No matter how
much work this mother contributes to maintain the home, it is likely that the
father will be treated as the person who maintains the home so long as he
invests more cash in the maintenance than she does. 69 If he owns the home

61.

E.g.. by filing a joint return.

62.

Compare rate schedules in section 1(a) and section 1(b).

63.

See I.R.C. § 2(b) (2001).

64.

Id.

65. Similarly, a foster child can qualify a parent for head of household status. However, a
child is not the taxpayer's foster child if the child's mother is living with them. See Rev. Rul. 84-89,
1984-1 C.B. 5.
66. See, e.g., Perez v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 1004 (1998); Louis P. Halvas, 97 S.B.E.
013 (Cal. St. Bd. Eq. Nov. 20, 1997), available at 1997 WL 768535 (applying the "boyfriend rule"
to deny head of household status on a California income tax return); accord Michael Curtis, 97
S.B.E. 012 (Cal. St. Bd. Eq. Aug. 1, 1997), availableat 1997 WL 694266.
67.

See supranote 46 and accompanying text.

68.

Treas. Reg. § 1.2-2(d) (2002).

69. The regulations provide the following guidance concerning the types of expenses to be
considered in deciding whether an individual qualifies for head of household status:
The cost of maintaining a household shall be the expenses incurred for the mutual
benefit of the occupants thereof by reason of its operation as the principal place of
abode of such occupants for such taxable year. The cost of maintaining a household
shall not include expenses otherwise incurred. The expenses of maintaining a
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or pays the rent, he should qualify. But to maintain head of household status,
he might be well advised to refrain from transferring any ownership interest
in the home to the mother.70 Nor should he pay her a wage to work in the
71
home, lest she begin to be viewed as the person who maintains the home.
The effect of this rule is to create a disincentive for the father to make wealth
transfers to the mother. This imbalance in power can lead to destabilization
of the home, which is not in the best interest of the child.72
Thus, head of household rates provide some help to the unmarried
heterosexual couple who have a child together. However, if the earning
household include property taxes, mortgage interest, rent, utility charges, upkeep and
repairs, property insurance, and food consumed on the premises. Such expenses do not
include the cost of clothing, education, medical treatment, vacations, life insurance,
and transportation. In addition, the cost of maintaining a household shall not include
any amount which represents the value of services rendered in the household by the
taxpayer or by a person qualifying the taxpayer as a head of household or as a
surviving spouse.
Rosen v. Comm'r, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2082 (1994) (citing section 1.2-2(d) of the Income Tax
Regulations).
70. While there is no explicit rule that requires the person claiming head of household to own
the home or to be the primary tenant on a lease, the issue of ownership has arisen in the context of
the dependency exemption under section 152(a)(9), which requires the dependent to have "as his
principal place of abode the home of the taxpayer." See, e.g., Bombarger v Comm'r, 31 T.C. 473
(1958) (denying a dependency exemption to someone who paid over half the cost of maintaining the
home because the home was owned by the dependent). But see Rev. Rul. 64-41, 1964-1 C.B. 84, in
which the IRS apparently reversed its position on this issue for purposes of claiming the dependency
exemption.
71. To prove that he is the one who maintains the home, he will have to establish the entire
cost of maintenance and show that he paid over half. See Rosen, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2082. Such a
proof is similar to that required to establish the validity of a dependency exemption. Taxpayers who
do furnish support to a household, often as the primary wage-eamer, may not be able to prove that
they furnished over fifty percent. Cf Blanco v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 512 (1971); Jeter v. Comm'r, 82
T.C.M. (CCH) 445 (2001).
If several members of a household contribute toward expenses which are equally
applicable to the support of each member of the household and there is no evidence of
actual support for individual members of a household, the contributing members are
presumed to have pooled their contributions to support the household, and each
member of the household is considered to have received an equal part of the
contributions as part of his support.
Daya v. Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 743 (2000) (holding that a son who could prove that he paid
over half the support for his mother nonetheless could not claim head of household because he failed
to prove that he paid over half the cost of maintaining the household).
72. The tax policy answer to this question may well be that the couple should marry because
marriage will provide more stability. See Coverdale, supra note 18. However, for those of us who
believe that the tax law should be neutral toward marriage, tax rules that support an imbalance in
wealth distribution between parents are bad. Indeed, the effect of the joint return is to treat marriage
as the determinative factor in income splitting rather than to require actual income splitting between
the spouses. Feminists have criticized this point about the joint return for years. See Carolyn C.
Jones, Split Income and SeparateSpheres: Tax Law and Gender Roles in the 1940's, 6 LAW & HIST.
REV. 259 (1988).
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partner in the couple is not the biological parent of the child, the benefit is
denied. And, when the benefit is available, the mechanics of qualifying for it
can discourage the male wage-earner from making wealth transfers to the
mother of his child.73
b.

Two-EarnerFamily

The current tax rules encourage parents who both earn income to avoid
marriage. The joint return rate schedule benefits only traditional families,
i.e., those that contain a single wage-earner. For the two-earner unmarried
couple with a child, each parent might file a return based on the rates for
single persons, or they might have one parent file as head of household and
the other file as a single taxpayer. This latter arrangement will produce the
lowest tax payment. 74 For this family, even in the absence of marriage, there
should be no problem showing that the child is the offspring of at least one
of the parents. That parent would then be entitled to file as head of
household, provided he or she can prove a contribution to more than fifty
percent of the household costs. Note that the requirement to provide more
than fifty percent of the household expenses can cause a problem for
households with more than two persons contributing to the family's support.
For example, if three adults equally support a household which includes75 a
child, the head of household filing benefit will not be available to anyone.
2.

The Same Sex Unmarried Couple: A True Story

When Helmi Hisserich and her lesbian partner of eight years, Tori,
decided to have a child together, they had no idea they would create
revolutionary precedent in the tax world.76 The two women decided that

73. Compare the effect of the current provision's incentive to the father in this hypothetical
to the requirement under the old "head of family provision" that to qualify the person must have the
"right to exercise family control." A "head of family" was "an individual who actually supports and
maintains in one household one or more individuals who are closely connected with him by blood
relationship, relationship by marriage, or by adoption, and whose right to exercise family control and
provide for these dependent individuals is based upon some moral or legal obligation." Rev. Rul.
57-415, 1957-2 C.B. 13. Qualifying as head of family entitled the individual to an additional
personal exemption. Id.
74.

Compare the rates of section 1(b) with those of section 1(c).

75.

See, e.g., Daya, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) at 743.

76. I met Helmi by email. When she went to a law professor in Los Angeles to ask for help
with her tax problem, she was referred to me. I listened to her story and in the end, just before the
deadline passed, I submitted an amicus brief to the California State Board of Equalization, which
was scheduled to hear arguments in her case on June 30, 2000. Helmi was represented at the oral
arguments by Shannon Minter of the National Center for Lesbian Rights in San Francisco. While I
was not Helmi's lawyer in this case, my interest as amicus stemmed from the fact that I thought she,
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Tori should be the birth mother and Helmi agreed that she would support
both Tori and the child until the child was old enough for Tori to go back to
work. In this regard, Helmi and Tori mirror the traditional family with a
stay-at-home spouse, supported by the working spouse. They visited the
sperm bank together, where they were counseled about procedures and
where they represented to the doctor and nurse counseling them that their
intention was to go through the pregnancy together and to parent the child
jointly.
On April 18, 1997, their child, Madeline, was born. The birth occurred
as a result of artificial insemination by an anonymous donor. The process
was supervised by a licensed physician, which meant that under California
law, the semen donor was not considered a parent.7 7 Consistent with their
agreement, Tori stayed home to care for the child and Helmi supported both
Tori and Madeline.
When it came time to file her 1997 tax return, Helmi consulted a tax
professional, read the instructions for the California return distributed by the
Franchise Tax Board, and prepared her tax return relying on a widely-used
computer program. She concluded that she was able to file as head of
household because her child, Madeline, was a member of her household for
the entire year, and because she was in the process of adopting her. 78 The
Franchise Tax Board decided otherwise and assessed a deficiency against
Helmi, arguing
a blood relative, an adopted child, or a
79 that Madeline was not 80
foster child.7 9 Relying on precedent, the Franchise Tax Board explained
that simply supporting a child is not sufficient to establish head of household
status for state income tax purposes. 8 1 Instead, the child must be the child of
the taxpayer, the child of the taxpayer's spouse, or a foster child.8 2 Each of
these cases concerned a head of household claim by a boyfriend who
maintained a household for his girlfriend and her child. The State Board
concluded in both cases that the child was not his, nor his stepchild since he
had not been married to the mother during that year, and could not be his

and others like her, should be entitled to claim head of household status on their tax returns.
77.

CAL. FAM. CODE § 7005(b) (West 2000).

78. Helmi Hisserich, No. 99A-0341 (Cal. St Bd. Eq. Nov. 1, 2000), available at 2000 WL
1880484.
79.

Id. at 3.

80. Louis P. Halvas, 97 S.B.E. 013 (Cal. St. Bd. Eq. Nov. 20, 1997), available at 1997 WL
768535; Michael E. Curtis, 97 S.B.E. 012 (Cal. St. Bd. Eq. Aug. 1, 1997), available at 1997 WL
694266.
81. Helmi Hisserich, No. 99A-0341 (Cal. St. Bd. Eq. Nov. 1, 2000), availableat 2000 WL
1880484.
82.

Id.
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foster child because the mother lived in the same household. 83 There was no
question that the boyfriend was the sole support of the child and entitled to
84
claim a dependency exemption against his income for the year in question,
but he could not claim head of household status since he was not sufficiently
related to the child. 85 Helmi decided to challenge the "boyfriend" precedent
as applied to her case. Relying primarily on arguments set forth in the
amicus brief I filed on her behalf, she argued that Madeline was in fact her
child. 86 The argument was based on a line of California surrogacy decisions
that had established a principle of intentional parenthood. 8 In short, the
argument was that since Helmi intended the child to be her own and since,
"but for" her intent the artificial insemination would never have taken place,
she became an intentional parent. 88 Her position can be analogized to that of
Luanne Buzzanca, who, together with her husband, entered a contract with
an unrelated women, who agreed to give birth to a child that the Buzzancas
intended to raise as their own. 89 Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Buzzanca contributed
genetic material in the form of eggs or sperm. 90 Thus, neither of the
intentional parents had a genetic tie to the child that the surrogate agreed to
91
bring to term.
When the Buzzancas divorced, Mr. Buzzanca took the position that he
was not the father and not responsible for child support. 9 2 Ultimately, the
California Court of appeals held that he was an intentional parent even
though he did not give birth and even though he was not genetically
connected with the child.9 3 The court similarly held Mrs. Buzzanca to be a
parent, much to her relief, since she wanted her parenthood to be
recognized.9 4

83.

Id.

84.

Id.

85.

Id.

86. See generally Helmi Hisserich, No. 99A-0341 (Cal. St. Bd. Eq. Nov. 1, 2000), available
at 2000 WL 1880484.
87. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (holding where there is both a mother
by genetic consanguinity and a birth mother, the one who intended to bring about the birth is the
natural mother); Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1410 (1998).
88.

Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.

89.

See Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 1410.

90.

Id. at 1412.

91.

Id.

92.

Id. at 1413.

93.

Id. at 1428.

94.

Id. at 1429.
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Helmi's parenthood had to be determined under California's version of
the Uniform Parentage Act as the Buzzancas parenthood was determined.9 5
If John Buzzanca could be held liable for child support for a child that he
neither gave birth to nor contributed to genetically, then it was appropriate to
hold Helmi responsible for the support of her daughter, Madeline. Since
head of household filing is primarily intended to benefit a parent in a
nontraditional family arrangement (i.e., one in which marriage is missing)
for the support of a child, Helmi should be entitled to file using head of
household rates. Although this argument did not convince the Franchise Tax
Board, the State Board of Equalization, in a precedent-setting decision,
agreed with Helmi. 9 6 Madeline is her child, at least for tax purposes.97
The IRS is purportedly looking into the Hisserich case98 to determine
how it affects federal head of household status, but thus far there have been
no published opinions or rulings. 99 For California taxpayers, Hisserich ought
to control the determination of head of household status for federal purposes.
This is because federal law generally relies on state law to determine family
relationships. 10 0 The parent-child relationship is defined by the state law of
California to include Helmi and Madeline. Thus, they are parent and child
for federal tax law purposes as well as for state tax law purposes.
Although the Hisserich principle ought to prevail for California same
sex parents, it may not be available to taxpayers in other states. Not every
state has adopted the same provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act that
California has. 10 1 Nor have states interpreted their family law provisions
95. Helmi Hisserich, No. 99A-0341 (Cal. St. Bd. Eq. Nov. 1, 2000), available at 2000 WL
1880484.
96.

Id.

97.

Id.

98. Eva Rosenberg, Same Sex Parents: Head of Household? (Dec. 29, 2000), at
www.taxmama.com/AskTaxMama/articles/samesex.html.
99. The IRS has been notoriously silent on tax issues that affect lesbian and gay families. For
example, numerous employers have begun extending domestic partner health benefits to their gay
and lesbian employees. The Human Rights Campaign reports that 4,408 employers offer domestic
partner benefits. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS, at
www.hrc.org/worknet/dp/index.asp (last visited Jan. 27, 2002). The IRS issued its first private letter
ruling on this matter more than ten years ago. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-34-048 (May 29, 1990). To date,
it has never issued a public ruling or instructions that would aid employers and employees in
determining what the tax effects are of such plans.
100. See, e.g., Eccles v. Comm'r, 19 T.C. 1049, aff'd208 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1953) (finding
marital status is determined under state law); Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60 (finding marital status
is determined under state law); see also De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (applying
California state law to define the word "children" in a case involving the application of federal
copyright laws to residents of California). The Supreme Court stated that "there is no federal law of
domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern." Id. at 580.
101.

The current UPA was written in 1973. Nineteen states have adopted it. See Battle
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broadly enough
to include same sex parents as co-parents in the absence of
10 2
adoption.
If head of household filing status is primarily intended to benefit an
unmarried person who is raising children, then the relationship requirement
is too narrow. While one can understand the reluctance to give a tax break to
someone who is supporting a girlfriend or boyfriend, 10 3 the head of
household tax break (or something similar) seems justified for single persons
who are supporting children, whether or not those taxpayers are related to
the children they are supporting. 10 4 Not only should taxpayers who mirror
Tori and Helmi's family be covered by head of household rules, but the
status ought to be extended to "boyfriends and girlfriends" who are
sufficiently committed to their partners (of either sex) to support them and
their dependent children. One simple way to accomplish this would be to
amend the definition of head of household to include any single individual
who supported a minor child as a member of his or her household, whether
or not the child was related to the taxpayer.
III. TAx CREDITS
There are two tax credits that require the taxpayer to have a legally
recognized relationship with a child in order to qualify. The two credits are
the earned income tax credit (EITC)10 and the child credit. 106
A.

The EarnedIncome Tax Credit

Certain low income taxpayers are entitled to a refundable tax credit if

Robinson & Susan Paikin, Who is Daddy? A Case for the Uniform Parentage Act (2000), 19
DELAWARE LAWYER 23, 24 n.6 (2001).
102. But see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 23 (2001) (requiring same sex partners in a civil union
to be treated the same as spouses in a marriage). Under the statute, if Helmi and Tori had been
civilly unioned in Vermont before their child was bom, Helmi should be presumed to be the second
parent in the same manner that husbands are presumed to be the fathers of their wives' children.
103. See generally Angstadt v. Comm'n of Intemal Revenue, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 693 (1968)
(concluding that to give a single man head of household status for supporting his girlfriend "would
create a 'tax haven' for American bachelors never envisioned by the Congress").
104. Even some relationships are too distant to satisfy head of household status. For
example, a taxpayer who takes in her grandniece and provides her with a household and support
would not qualify for head of household status unless the grandniece can be considered the
taxpayer's foster child. See I.R.C. § l(b) (2001); I.R.C. § 151. Nor would a taxpayer qualify who
provides a household for her sister-in-law's youngest brother. I.R.C. § 151.
105.

I.R.C. § 32.

106.

I.R.C. § 24.
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they meet the section 32 requirements of the Internal Revenue Code. 107 The
amount of the credit is higher if the taxpayer has "a qualifying child for the
taxable year.' 1 8 Both married and unmarried taxpayers can claim the
credit.' The credit is phased out as income rises and is determined by
calculating the "phaseout amount." 110 If two individuals marry, they must
file a joint return and combine their earned income, thereby increasing their
"phaseout amount." As a result, two low-income individuals who qualify for
the EITC as single taxpayers generally experience a reduction in the EITC
upon marriage. The recently enacted Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001 reduces this aspect of the "marriage
penalty" by
1
increasing the "phaseout amount" for married couples. "'
A qualifying child is one who: (1) is a son or daughter or other lineal
descendant of the taxpayer, or is a stepchild or foster child of the taxpayer;
and (2) has the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than
12
half of the tax year; and (3) does not exceed certain age requirements."
This definition requires the qualifying child to be related to the taxpayer in
the same way that the head of household rules require. As demonstrated in
the previous section, this limited definition is sometimes too narrow because
it may exclude a low-income taxpayer who is in fact supporting a minor
child unrelated to the taxpayer in any of the statutorily prescribed ways.
There is one important difference between the EITC and head of
household status. To prove head of household status, the taxpayer must
provide over half the support for the home that he or she shares with the
child for more than half the year. By contrast, to claim the EITC, the
taxpayer must merely reside with the child for more than half the year. The
child, or the household, might in fact be supported by someone else.
However, if that someone else also resides in the household, is related to the
qualifying child in one of the ways set out in the statute (i.e., a grandparent),
and has a higher income, then the qualifying child will be assigned to the
higher income occupant. 113
The structure of the EITC makes it difficult to apply to nontraditional

107.

I.R.C. § 32.

108.

Id.

109.

Id.

110.

Id.

111.
(2001).

Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-16, § 303

112. I.R.C. § 32(c)(3) (2001). The age requirements are at subsection (c)(3)(C). The child
must be under nineteen or, if a student, under twenty-four. There is no age limitation if the child is
permanently disabled. Id.
113.

See I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(C).
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families. At times, the provision can be overinclusive in that it gives a credit
to a parent with low earned income, who arguably doesn't deserve the
refund since she and the child are being supported by her unmarried
partner.114 At other times, the provision can be underinclusive because the
single breadwinner in the family, who supports the mother and the child, is
not in fact related to the116child. 115 In sum, it does not seem well tailored to
nontraditional families.
B.

The Child Tax Credit

A taxpayer is entitled to a $500 tax credit for each qualifying child.1 17
The amount of the credit is reduced as income rises. 118 A qualifying child is
one for whom the taxpayer is entitled to claim a dependency deduction,
provided the child has not yet attained age seventeen, and further provided
that the child is related to the taxpayer in the same manner as is required by
the EITC.11 9

This credit is broadly available. It is not restricted to low-income
taxpayers. Unmarried taxpayers with "modified adjusted gross income"
below $75,000 are entitled to the full credit. 12 Some commentators have
criticized this provision because it is not sufficiently tailored
to help those
12 1
who experience the ever-increasing costs of childcare.

If the primary

114. E.g., assume Tori went back to work and earned $10,000 but was still supported by
Helmi, who was earning $80,000. If we recognize Madeline as Helmi's child, which I think we
should, then Tori should not be entitled to an EITC. She would not be entitled to one if she and
Helmi were married. But if tax law refuses to recognize Helmi as Madeline's parent, then Tori
would be entitled to the EITC despite the fact that she was being supported by Helmi. Allowing Tori
to claim the EITC is, in my opinion, overinclusive.
115. E.g., assume Tori is not working and Helmi is attempting to support them both on a
salary low enough to qualify her for the EITC. In this fact situation, we should want Helmi to take
advantage of the credit because it will help her support her child.
116. While one would not want a passing stranger to claim any available child as his own in
order to claim tax benefits, a requirement that the taxpayer maintain the household by providing over
half the support would seem sufficient to justify the deduction and to limit it to worthy cases. The
potential for assigning the benefit of the child to the person who can use it most is already limited by
I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(C), which provides that if a qualifying child resides in a household with more than
one wage-earner, the child will be treated as the child of the higher wage-earner. This rule limits the
credit since the credit decreases as income rises. See LeStrange v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 685
(1997).
117. I.R.C. § 24 (2001). The 2001 Tax Act increases the $500 amount to S 1,000, but the
increase is phased in over a ten year period. See Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 201 (2001).
118.

Id.

119.

I.R.C.

120.

I.R.C. § 24(b)(2).

121.

See, e.g., Sharon C. Nantell, The Tax Paradigm of Child Care: Shifting Attitudes

§ 24(c).
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purpose of the provision is to help with the childcare costs of working
parents, then the single parent in a non-traditional household will always get
the benefit of the credit, provided she works enough to owe $500 (or the
credit amount) in taxes for the year. However, to the extent the credit is
provided to all families, including those that have minimal childcare
expenses, and is justified on the grounds that it helps to offset the cost of
raising a child generally, the impact of the relationship requirement will
deprive some nontraditional families from claiming the credit (e.g., a same
sex couple with a child) when it is available to similarly-situated traditional
couples (e.g., the married couple with a stepchild).
IV. STATE INHERITANCE TAXES

A. In General
Relationships are pivotal in determining the amount of inheritance tax
due. Not only are spousal relationships crucial, as they are under the federal
estate tax, but parent-child relationships and other blood relationships are
crucial as well. In Iowa, for example, there is no tax levied on transfers to
spouses or lineal descendants. 122 Before the recent amendments to the Iowa
statute, children who received an inheritance were entitled to significant
exemptions before the tax kicked in. 123 Transfers to blood relatives are taxed
at a lower rate than transfers to persons outside the traditional family
relationship. 124 The burden of the tax can fall on either the residuary taker or
on the beneficiary who receives a specific bequest. 125 When the tax
incidence is on the beneficiary, the result is to reduce the inheritance or
bequest.
Approximately one-third of the states currently have some form of
inheritance tax. 126 For nontraditional families in these states the absence of a
Towarda Private/Parental/Public
Alliance, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 879,955 (1997).
122.

See IOWA CODE § 450.9 (2001).

123.

E.g., $50,000 for each child. IOWA CODE § 450.9 (1996).

124. E.g., the tax on a transfer to a niece will be lower than a transfer to a same sex
committed partner of many years, who, for inheritance tax purposes, is treated as a stranger. See
IOWA CODE § 450.9.
125. The inheritance tax is a tax on the right of succession and thus can be charged against
the beneficiary. See In re Millard's Estate, 105 N.W.2d 95 (1960). Alternatively, a testator can direct
that inheritance taxes be charged against the estate, in which case, the residency beneficiary will
normally bear the burden. See generally IOWA CODE § 633.436 (2001).
126. See PETER M. BERKERY, JR. & GREGORY A. DIGGINS, GAY FINANCES IN A STRAIGHT
WORLD: A COMPREHENSIVE FINANCIAL PLANNING HANDBOOK 134 (1998) (listing states with such
laws as of 1998).
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legally recognized relationship can impose costly tax burdens at a time when
they are already aggrieved. The federal estate tax, as well, punishes these
families by denying them a marital deduction for property that passes
between the parents 128
at the death of the first parent. 127 1 have addressed those
elsewhere.
concerns
B. A Case in Point
Wooster v. Iowa Tax Commission129 demonstrates the harshness of the

inheritance tax rules. In this case, the alleged daughter
discovered after her death that she was not in fact the
decedent. 130 Grace, the alleged daughter, argued that
adoption by estoppel applied. 131 Here are the basic facts

of the decedent
daughter of the
the doctrine of
as stated by the

court:

Shortly after her birth Grace came into the custody of an orphanage
in New York, and in 1888, when she was about two years of age,
was taken into the childless family of Samuel M. Wooster and
Delia B. Wooster of Boone, Iowa, with whom she lived
continuously until their deaths. During this time they treated her as
their daughter, and until the year 1937, shortly prior to the death of
Delia (who survived her husband), Grace supposed she was their
natural child and at all times rendered to them the services of a
daughter. No record of statutory adoption was found. It is
conceded that insofar as Delia B. Wooster or Samuel M. Wooster,
or persons claiming by, through or under them are concerned, an
adoption by estoppel was created by the actions of the foster
parents and child toward each other. The trial court held plaintiff to
be entitled to the exemption and [the] rate [was] fixed for an
adopted child. Decree was entered
accordingly and the Iowa State
32
Tax Commission has appealed.1
The Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state of Iowa could

127. The Internal Revenue Code exempts from estate and gift tax all transfers between
spouses through a marital deduction provision. See I.R.C. § 2056 (2001) (estate tax marital
deduction); I.R.C. § 2523 (gift tax marital deduction).
128. Patricia Cain, Death Taxes: A Critique from the Margin, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2002).
129.

298 N.W. 922 (Iowa 1941).

130.

Id.

131.

Id.

132.

Id. at 923.
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not be estopped because the doctrine could only be applied to estop the
parents, i.e., those responsible for the situation. 133 While that holding may
be an accurate application of the doctrine of estoppel, it does not directly
address the statutory construction issue: who is a child for purposes of the
inheritance tax? The answer to this question is even more
important today
134
because gifts to children are totally exempt from the tax.
Foster children, 135 and children in nonmarital relationships such as in
gay or lesbian families, will be treated as unrelated strangers to the decedent
unless the decedent is able to complete the adoption before death. And, since
there are no exemptions for unrelated parties, even if they are minor children
who were dependent on the decedent, the inheritance tax will be imposed.
Iowa is not alone in making this distinction between legally recognized
children and children who are part of nontraditional families, in which the
parent unfortunately dies before the adoption is completed. In a 1937
Montana case, a father had begun to prepare papers for the adoption of a
child, was supporting him, and paying for his education, but died before
official adoption papers were completed. 13 6 In his will, he left everything 137
to
him.
adopting
of
process
the
in
was
he
that
said
the child and
Nonetheless, the court imposed an inheritance tax at the highest level,
applicable to strangers, and failed to give any credit for the existing parentchild relationship. 8
V. CONCLUSION

These tax law examples encourage us to rethink the meaning of "child"
as the term is used in statutes. In the past, adopted children, foster children,
and stepchildren have all been excluded from tax law definitions of "child."
That omission has been generally remedied. However, the law continues to
ignore the legal relationship between children in nontraditional families and
the parents who have chosen to parent those children, even when those
parents are morally, and sometimes legally, responsible for the support of
such children.

133.

Id. at 925.

134.

IOWA CODE § 450.9 (1998).

135. Note that half the children in foster care in 1987 were black. See Sylvia Sims Gray &
Lynn M. Nybell, Issues in African-American FamilyPreservation,69 CHILD WELFARE 513 (1990).
136.

See In re Clark's Estate, 74 P.2d 401,403 (Mont. 1937).

137.

Id. at 403-07.

138. See Clark's Estate, 74 P.2d at 401; see also Lyman v. Sullivan, 157 A.2d 759 (Conn.
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I believe the law's blindness to these real relationships can discriminate
against the very children that the law is generally believed to protect. The
tax rules that are intended to provide benefits to households with minor
dependent children should provide those benefits to all households with
minor dependent children. It should do so whether the parents are married or
not, and whether the parents are of the opposite or the same sex.
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